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COMMONWEALTH v. THOMAS

the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment," it is
the policy of that body which should initially determine
the manner in which state misconduct is to be handled.
Undoubtedly, an illegal search by a state officer constitutes
a federal crime,8 but it has been held that Congress does
not mean to extend its regulations to the point of excluding the evidence disclosed. 9 On the other hand, authority
to exclude evidence obtained by a federal officer can be
readily found in the doctrine of checks and balances, justifying more careful judicial scrutiny of the activity40 of a
subordinate member of the federal executive branch.
ARioLD M. WEINER

Proximate Cause And Furtherance Of Design
Felony-Murder And Guilt Of One Felon
For The Death Of His Accomplice

-

Commonwealth v. Thomas'
The defendant and Jackson held up and robbed a
butcher shop of a sum of money. Jackson was armed. When
the two men had gotten the money, they fled from the shop,
each going in a different direction. The proprietor of the
shop obtained his own gun and chased Jackson, and in an
exchange of gunfire, killed the fleeing felon. The defendant was subsequently apprehended and indicted for the
murder of his slain accomplice. At the trial, the defendant
ences of opinion in such situations undoubtedly arise. In the Irvine case,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented on the ground that the particular state
misconduct was intolerable, In his judgment being worse than a mere unreasonable search and seizure. He said:
"While there is In the case before us, as there was in Rochin, an
element of unreasonable search and seizure, what is decisive here, as
in Rochin, Is additional aggravating conduct which the Court finds
repulsive."
Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128, dis. op. 142, 144 (1954).
U. S. Const. Amend. XIV, Sec. 5.
Of. Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91 (1945).
Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S. 117, 120 (1951).
,C,"Where powers are separated, each branch has its own powers and
prerogatives the exercise of which serves to restrain the other 'branches, this
creating a check-and-balance system. The latter had long been considered
a safe-guard against tyranny." FEROuSoN & McHENRY, ELMENTS OF
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1st ed. 1950) 52.
"Under separation of powers . . . the executive will restrict Its activity
to conduct under the law; for an Independent judiciary will serve as a check
on the executive." Gn'FFrr,
THE IMPASSE or DEMORAcy (1939) 175.
1382 Pa. 39, 117 A. 2d 204 (1955)
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demurred to the Commonwealth's evidence, and the court
sustained the demurrer. On appeal by the Commonwealth
to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the Court posed the
question: ". . . can a co-felon be found guilty of murder
where the victim of an armed robbery justifiably kills the
other felon as they flee from the scene of the crime?" '
Reversing the judgment of the trial court and ordering a
new trial, the Court, in a four to three decision, answered
the question in the affirmative.
The statute governing the case provided that "All murder.., which shall be committed in the perpetration of...
any... robbery... shall be murder in the first degree...
The Court reasoned as follows: (1) Common law murder
is a killing with malice aforethought;4 (2) the malice might
be expressed or implied; (3) the malice of the initial act of
robbery attached to all that followed;' (4) the defendant
set in motion a chain of events which ended in the death
of his accomplice;' (5) the robbery was the proximate cause
of the death;7 (6) the killing was committed during the
perpetration of a robbery; (7) the defendant, therefore,
was guilty of murder in the first degree. On the basis of its
prior decisions, the Court decided that the fact that the
victim of the homicide was a co-felon was immaterial,8 and
the fact that the killing itself was a justifiable one on the
part of the butcher was irrelevant, the important factor
being that at the outset it was readily foreseeable that the
robbery victim would have to defend himself, and that it
was likely that someone would be killed.
In a concurring opinion (in rebuttal of the dissents)
Justice Bell reasoned, in a manner similar to that of the
Court's opinion, that defendant was guilty of murder, the
justifiability of the homicide being no more tenable than
the defense of accidental or unintentional killing of the
victim during the perpetration of other felonies. Justice
Bell reasoned further that as respects the defendant, the
killing was not justifiable, that in light of the reason for
the "origin, development and application to modern con2Ibid, 204.
8 18 Purdon's Statutes (Pa., 1939), Sec. 4701.
' Citing Oommonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. St. Rep. 9, 15 (1868).
s Citing Commonwealth v. Guida, 341 Pa. 305, 310, 19 A. 2d 98, 100 (1941).
Supra, n. 1, 205.
R
' Citing Commonwealth v. Moyer, 357 Pa. 181, 191, 53 A. 2d 736, 741
(1947), noted: 17 Ford. L. Rev. 124 (1948) ; 22 Tulane L. Rev. 325 (1947);
96 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 278 (1947).
8Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa. 500, 113 A. 2d 464 (1955), noted 17
Univ. of Pitt. L. Rev. 101 (1955) ; 10 Rutgers L. Rev. 446 (1955) ; 40 Minn.
L. Rev. 267 (1956).
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ditions" of the felony-murder doctrine which "was and is
'the protection of society"' it made no difference who in
fact pulled the trigger or who was killed "if the killing
occurred in a robbery".
In a lengthy dissenting opinion, ° Justice Jones pointed
out that the Court imputed an act to the defendant, whereas, the commonly imputed factor is malice where the defendant is actually the actor. He stated, further, that (1)
the mere coincidence of a killing with a felony is insufficient, (2) there must be causation in furtherance of the
felonious design, (3) the analogy of proximate cause to
tort law is inadequate here because it raises necessary considerations of superseding causes which the Court avoided,
(4) the Court infringes on the legislative domain by creating crimes and punishments, (5) the statute creates no
crimes, but merely categorizes the common law crime of
murder into two degrees, and does not refer to mere homicide or killing as the court's decision implies it does, (6) the
cases upon which the Court relied are inconsistent with
prior Pennsylvania law, and with the law of other jurisdictions, and that (7) this was justifiable homicide. Another
dissenting opinion took the same approach."
TiE DocTRNEs INvOLvED
The basic doctrine involved in all cases of this sort is
that of felony-murder or constructive murder. If a felon,
in the perpetration of a felony, commits an unjustifiable2
homicide, he is guilty of murder at the common law.
While this doctrine underlies the discussion of the principal case, it is not directly in issue. Consideration should
be directed, rather, to the question of whether, granting
the validity of the felony-murder doctrine, it should be
extended to apply to the instant situation. In other words,
by what tests should the felony-murder doctrine be applied?
In attempting to answer this question, two doctrines will
9 Supra, n. 1, cone. op. 206, 207.
"Supra, n. 1, dis. op. 213.
Supra, n. 1, 221.
At common law there were no degrees of murder. All murder was
treated equally in this regard. Statutes enacted in comparatively recent
times distinguish between two degrees of murder. Felony murder statutes,
then, in effect do no more than codify the common law by providing that
felony murder Is first degree murder. For excellent discussions of the
felony murder doctrine see: Corcoran, Felony Murder in New York, 6 Ford.
L. Rev. 43 (1937) ; Arent and MacDonald, The Felony Murder Doctrine and
Its Application under the New York Statutes, 20 Cornell L. Q. 288 (1935) ;
Mosel, A Survey of Felony Murder, 28 Temple L. Q. 453 (1955) ; Perkins,
The Law of Homicide, 36 J.Crim. L. and Criminology 391, 401, 405 (1946).
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be considered, i.e., the doctrine of proximate-cause" and,
the furtherance doctrine.14
The Court in the instant case applied the doctrine of
proximate cause, the concurring opinion there adopting the
Pennsylvania law set forth in Comfollowing statement of
15
monwealth v. Bolish.

"If a person with legal malice commits an act or sets
off a chain of events from which, in the common experience of mankind, the death of another is a natural
or reasonably foreseeable result, that person is guilty
of murder, if death results from that act or from the
events which it naturally produced."
Under the furtherance doctrine, however, "the accomplice
in the felony is responsible, as at common law, for only
those acts of his associate which are committed in pursuance to the common design,

. . .",

so that, if the killing is

not done in furtherance of the plan, the felony-murder doctrine does not apply, and the defendant accomplice is not
guilty of murder. If, on the other hand, the killing occurs
in furtherance of the felony, as where the felon kills an
intended victim who resists, the felony-murder doctrine
does apply. These two doctrines, will be given further consideration, below, in connection with cases in which they
were held to apply.
THE CASES IN PENNSYLVANIA

In his dissent, Justice Jones pointed out that until the
decision in Commonwealth v. Almeida, 7 the rule uniformly
followed in Pennsylvania was that "the killing must have
been done by the defendant or by an accomplice or confederate or by one acting in furtherance of the felonious
13McLaughlin, Proximate Cau8e, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 149 (1925). See also:
Beale, The Proximate Con8equence8 of an Act, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 633 (1920) ;
Edgerton, Legal Cau8e, 72 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 211 and 343 (1924), and the
cases cited in the following discussion.
"'Arent and MacDonald, supra, n. 12, 307; and see the cases cited in the
discussion that follows below.
15Supra, n. 8, 474. Italics added.
16 Arent and MacDonald, supra, n. 12, 307.
17362 Pa. 596, 68 A. 2d 595, 12 A. L. R. 2d 183 (1949) ; noted: 98 Univ. of
Pa. L. Rev. 431 (1950); 40 J. Crim. L. and Criminology 617 (1950) ; 30
B. Univ. L. Rev. 423 (1950). See also: People v. Podelski, 332 Mich. 508,
52 N. W. 2d 201 (1952), cert. den. 344 U. S. 845 (1952), reh. den. 344 U. S.
888 (1952); and Hornbeck v. State, 77 So. 2d 876 (Fla., 1955), both in
accord with the Almeida case. In the Hornbeck case, the statute referred

to all unlawful killing.
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undertaking";8 but, the majority was not persuaded that
such was the law. In the Almeida case, in which a police
officer was killed while attempting to apprehend escaping
robbers, it was held immaterial whether the fatal shot came
from a gun of the felons, police, or even the victim's wife,
since the death was the proximate result of the robbery.
Pennsylvania cases prior to the Almeida case had held that
a felon was guilty of murder: when his accomplice killed
a policeman, even where the defendant had been apprehended and was in custody prior to the shooting;"9 when a
maid in a house which was being burglarized died as the
result of having been gagged by the felons; 0 when a gas
station attendant died as a result of a bullet wound which
the court found had been inflicted by one of the felons;2
and when the death arose out of a riot between two groups
of men.22 Two cases prior to Almeida indicated that the
defendant might not have been guilty of murder had the
death been accidentally caused by a third person trying to
apprehend the felon.28
The first case in Pennsylvania in which defendant was
held guilty of the murder of an accomplice was Commonwealth v. Bolish.2 4 In that case the felons conspired to burn
down a house, and the victim, one of the felons, and the one
who had actually set the fire was killed in the resulting
conflagration. The Court held that there was no distinction
between that case and a case in which an innocent person
is killed, since in either event the loss of life is "readily
foreseeable", and the death is the proximate and natural
result of the arson. In at least one important respect, the
instant case carries the felony-murder doctrine beyond
all prior Pennsylvania decisions. In all, save the Almeida
case, the defendants either were the actors or were in concert with the actors. In Almeida, while the evidence was
not conclusive, the victim's famiy did testify that the fatal
shot came from the gun of one of the felons, and one of the
a382 Pa. 639, 117 A. 2d 204, dis. op. 213, 215; citing inter alia: Commonwealth v. Wooding, 355 Pa. 555, 50 A. 2d 328 (1947) ; Commonwealth v.
Pepperman, 353 Pa. 373, 45 A. 2d 35 (1946); Commonwealth v. Elliott,
349 Pa. 488, 37 A. 582 (1944).
19Commonwealth v. Doris, 287 Pa. 547, 135 A. 313 (1926).
91Commonwealth v. Guida, 341 Pa. 305, 19 A. 2d 98 (1941).
' Commonwealth v. Moyer, 357 Pa. 181, 53 A. 2d 736 (1947), noted: 17
Ford. L. Rev. 124 (1948) ; 22 Tulane L. Rev. 325 (1947) ; 96 Univ. Pa. L.
Rev. 278 (1947).
'Commonwealth v. Hare, 2 Pa. L. J. R. 467 (1844).
2Commonwealth v. Thompson, 321 Pa. 327, 184 A. 97 (1936) ; Commonwealth v. Mellor, 294 Pa. 339, 144 A. 534 (1928).
2381 Pa. 500, 113 A. 2d 464 (1955), noted 17 Univ. of Pitt. L. Rev. 101
(1955) ; 10 Rutgers L. Rev. 446 (1955) ; 40 Minn. L. Rev. 267 (1956).
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felons did plead guilty. The possibility that the shot came
from the gun of another was raised by defendant only as a
possible inference. In Thomas, the principal case, there
was no question about the defendant's action. He did not
participate in any of the shooting, and apparently wasn't
even around to watch it.

THE CASES IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

The earliest case dealing with this question is Commonwealth v. Campbell,2" a Massachusetts case. In that case it
was held that where a death arose out of a gun battle between the National Guard inside an armory and a mob
protesting conscription outside the armory, it had to be
proved that the fatal shot came from outside the armory
in order to hold members of the rioting mob guilty of
murder. The ruling was on an instruction of the trial Court,
and the Court was not en banc at the time. The jury acquitted the defendant. The Court stated that:
"There can be no doubt of the general rule of law,
that a person engaged in the commission of an unlawful act is legally responsible for all the consequences
which may naturally or necessarily flow from it, and
that, if he combines and confederates with others to
accomplish an illegal purpose, he is liable criminaliter
for the acts of each and all who participate with him
in the execution of the unlawful design. As they all
act in concert for a common object, each is the agent
of all the others, and the acts done are therefore the
acts of each and all. [This] is subject to the reasonable limitation that the particular act of one of a party
for which his associates and confederates are to be held
liable must be shown to have been done for the furtherance . . . of the common object and design for
which they combined together. ... No person can be
held guilty of homicide unless the act is either actually
or constructively his, and it can not be his act in either
sense unless committed by his own hand or by someone acting in concert with him or in furtherance of a
common object or purpose. Certainly that cannot be
said to be an act of a party in any just sense, or on any
sound legal principle, which is not only not done by
z7 Allen (89 Mass.) 541 (1863).
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him, or by any one with whom he is associated... but
is committed by a person who is his direct and immediate adversary,. ."I2
The Pennsylvania Court in the Almeida case distinguished the Campbell case, held it to be an incorrect statement of the law, and then relied on the Hare case,2 7 which
appears to be factually distinguishable from Campbell and
Almeida in that both groups in Hare were engaged in unlawful conduct.
The next case which dealt with the question was an
Illinois case, Butler v. People.2" There, it was held that
where an officer was being assaulted, and in attempting to
defend himself, shot and killed an innocent bystander, the
conviction of the officer's assailants had to be reversed since
the slaying was not in furtherance of the common design.
In Commonwealth v. Moore,29 a Kentucky case, the owner
of a house, the victim of a robbery, in attempting to defend
himself, shot and killed an innocent third person. The
Court, in affirming the dismissal of the indictment of the
robber, held that since the robber did not aid and abet the
slaying, and since it was not in furtherance of the felony,
he could not be tried for murder. In a case nearly on all
fours with Thomas factually, the Illinois Court held that
where one of a group of robbers was mysteriously killed
during the course of the robbery, the remaining robbers
could not be convicted of his murder unless it was proved
that one of them fired the fatal shot. The Court held that
there was no evidence to show that the plan of robbery included the killing of an accomplice, and the killing was
plainly not in furtherance of the felony."0 In People v.
Ferlin,31 involving arson, similarly to the Bolish 32 case, a
California court held that since the death of a co-conspirator in the execution of a plan of arson was not within the
scope of the felony, and not in furtherance of its execution,
the trial court was correct in granting defendant's motion
"Ibid, 543-545. Parenthetical word supplied.

"Supra, n. 22.
125 Ill. 641, 18 N. E. 338 (1888).
0 121 Ky. 97, 88 S. W. 1085 (1905).
UPeople v. Garippo, 292 I1. 293, 127 N. E. 75 (1920).
3203
Cal. 587, 265 P. 230 (1928) ; Of. People v. Cabaltero, 31 Cal. App. 2d
52, 87 P. 2d 364 (1939), where in affirming the conviction of defendants
for the murder of a co-felon, the Court relied on the fact that the victim
was killed by his confederates, thus distinguishing Ferlin.
$,Supra,n. 24.
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for a new trial." However, in 1952, in People v. Podolski,34
the Supreme Court of Michigan, after referring, inter alia,
to the above Massachusetts, Illinois and Kentucky cases,
adopted the proximate cause approach to sustain a murder
conviction of the defendant who had participated in the
armed robbery of a bank when, during his attempt to
escape and the ensuing gun battle with officers, one of the
officers was killed by a bullet from the weapon of a fellow
officer. The court said: "We think the better reasoning
appears in a Pennsylvania case, Commonwealth v. Moyer"
• . .", and relied upon a quotation of proximate cause from
that case.
It may thus be seen that there are two distinct lines of
cases dealing with the question of guilt under the felonymurder doctrine: the one, espousing proximate cause; the
other, espousing furtherance. The former finds guilt when
there is proximate cause, the latter when there is furtherance. Some, of course, require both. The grounds for the
adoption of either idea, or both, appear to be manifold:
theories of punishment;"8 construction of statutory language;8 7 and public policy as manifest in statutes; 8 or,
possibly personal predilections.
Certainly, the principal case is what might be termed
borderline. It presents an opportunity for the application
of either or both the proximate cause or furtherance ideas.
It would appear that while local theories of punishment,
and gravity of accompanying felony, etc., might be important, more critical guides for the application of doctrine
would be local public policy as expressed in legislation or
existing case law, and judicial construction. Some Courts
might be governed by whether the statutes refer to "killing" or "homicide" or "murder". In a case such as Thomas,
it would be easier to apply the felony murder doctrine by
81See also: People v. Udwin, 254 N. Y. 255, 172 N. B. 489 (1930) ; State v.
Oxendine, 187 N. C. 658, 122 S. E. 568 (1924) ; People v. Sobieskoda, 235
N. Y. 411, 139 N. E. 558 (1923) ; Shockley v. United States, 166 F. 2d 704
(9th Cir., 1948) ; United States v. Boyd, 45 F. 851 (C. C. W. D. Ark., 1890),
reversed on other grounds 142 U. S.450 (1892).
"'332 Mich. 508, 52 N. W. 2d 201, 204 (1952), cert. den. 344 U. S. 845
(1952), reh. den. 344 U. S. 888 (1952).
8357 Pa. 181, 53 A. 2d 736, 741 (1947), noted: 17 Ford. L. Rev. 124 (1948)
22 Tulane L. Rev. 325 (1947) ; 96 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 278 (1947), and followed
by the Almeida case, 8upra, circa, ns. 17, 18.
8 See the concurring opinion in the instant Thomas case, 382 Pa. 639, 117
A. 2d 204, 206 (1955).
I" See the dissenting opinion of Justice Jones In Thomas, ibid, 213.
81See the majority and concurring opinions in Thomas, ibid. In this
regard, see also Strahorn, Criminology and the Law of Guilt, 15 Md. L.
Rev. 287 (1955).
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way of the proximate cause idea if the statute referred to
"killing" or "homicide".8 9
By using proximate cause in Thomas, the Pennsylvania
Court has extended the felony murder doctrine beyond the
point at which it is no longer applied under some decisions
in other jurisdictions, and in one respect (that defendant
was a co-felon) beyond all prior Pennsylvania decisions.
Whether added to Podolskij it indicates a modern trend
toward the proximate cause approach in jurisdictions
where this is not precluded by prior decision remains to
be seen. The sharp division in the Pennsylvania Court emphasizes that the question for the time being is a close one.
THE LAW IN MARYLAND

The Maryland Court of Appeals does not appear to have
been faced with the question of the Thomas case. In fact,
beyond general discussions defining common law murder,
etc., the Court has only stated that the Maryland statute4
does not create a new crime, but merely establishes two
degrees of common law murder.42 The Maryland statute
is substantially the same as Pennsylvania's, providing that
"all murder which shall be committed in the perpetration
of, or attempt to perpetrate,... robbery,... shall be murder
in the first degree".
There have been cases in which murder was committed
in the perpetration of a felony,43 and the Court has held,
thus adopting the felony-murder doctrine, that a killing in
the perpetration of a robbery is murder in the first degree.44
There is every reason to believe that a co-felon would be
liable for the acts of his accomplices.4
There has been one case at the nisi prius level in which
the question was considered. - State v. Biggue,46 tried before the late Judge Adams in the Criminal Court of Baltimore City. The defendant had attempted a robbery at the
Bayview yards of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad in Balti-

1

For an example of a case applying Pennsylvania doctrine under a
statute referring to "killing", see Hornbeck v. State, 77 So. 2d 876 (Fla.,

1955).
,0 Supra, n. 34.
,Md. Code (1951) Art. 27, Sec. 497.
"2Abbott v. State, 188 Md. 310, 52 A. 2d 489 (1947) ; Wood v. State, 191
Md. 658, 62 A. 2d 576 (1948).
"8Wood v. State; ibid, Insurance Co. v. Prostic, 169 Md. 535, 182 A. 421
(1936).
" Bozman v. State, 193 Md. 196, 66 A. 2d 401 (1949).
"Beall v. State, 203 Md. 380, 101 A. 2d 233 (1953) ; Watson v. State, ...
Md. ... , 117 A. 2d 549 (1955).
"Criminal Court of Baltimore City, No. 2191, July 25, 1938.
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more and one of two guards, who had engaged the defendant in a gun battle, was slain. The defendant, indicted for
the guard's murder, pleaded that the, fatal shot came from
the gun of the victim's fellow officer. The State demurred
to the plea. Judge Adams overruled the demurrer, holding
that the plea set up a valid defense to the charge of murder,
and dismissed the charge.
There being no binding Court of Appeals precedent in
Maryland, the door is open for the Court to approach the
question of the application of the Maryland statute, with
an eye to local policy, and with proper consideration of the
purposes and policies of the criminal law.4" The Court
might well be governed by what it considers to be the
proper weight to be given the three basic elements of any
criminal act: an intent; an act; and a corpus delicti;4 8 and
that the statute speaks not of killing, but of
to the fact
49
murder.
ZALMAN

A. KEKST

47Strahorn, op. cit., 8upra, n. 38.
"Ibid.
"This necessarily raises such questions as the extent to which the Maryland statute codifies or modifies the common law felony-murder doctrine,
and whether the legislative use of the word murder, rather than killing was
intentional, or merely fortuitous.

